Giving preeminence to military interests over humanitarian considerations in international law may encourage attacks that violate the jus ad bellum because the generation of an armed attack will entitle targeting individuals in order to further the goals of entities carrying out the attacks. If this happens, individuals will be treated as means, and their human dignity will be violated. Thus, attacks on life in the mentioned circumstances violate the foundational value of both human rights and humanitarian law norms. Therefore, in order to discourage resorting to war and tweaking the law, depriving humanitarian guarantees of their effectiveness, a prevalent human rights law approach that acknowledges the arbitrariness and ensuing unlawfulness in those conducts is necessary.
INTRODUCTION
Currently, with the threat of ISIS and the actions of non-state armed actors, two sets of challenges ensue:
firstly, making sure that operations in the territory of third countries against them are necessary and do lead to interpretations of law that could be prone to justify abuses, while also permitting responding to the challenges of such conduct lest individuals are unprotected against them. This paper will examine both sets of issues, arguing for a humane approach and the idea that the principle of human dignity or the pro homine or pro personae considerations must guide every implementation of international law, to demand that no abuses or excessive uses Quaestio Iuris vol. 09, nº. 02, Rio de Janeiro, 2016. pp. 980-1011 DOI: 10.12957/rqi.2016.22449 _vol.09, nº. 02, Rio de Janeiro, 2016. pp. 980-1011 983 achieve its goals, thus disregard their human dignity, that according to the human rights philosophy constitutes the inner worth of every individual, even of those accused of violating the rights of others. 10 What must not be forgotten is that human dignity constitutes the foundation of human rights law. 11 Therefore, I sustain that acts contrary to it should be considered as unlawful for human rights law, even if they are permitted by other branches of international law. Furthermore, the fact that human rights law is applicable both in times of peace and during armed conflicts 12 presupposes that it cannot be disregarded during the latter, and thus acts that imply the intentional causation of death of individuals that violate their dignity, even if they take place during armed conflicts, are contrary to human rights law.
What is more, however, is that human dignity also informs several norms of international humanitarian law, as has been acknowledged by doctrine and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, that went as far as saying that human rights law and IHL share some common rights and norms precisely given their protection of human dignity, by saying that "In common with other universal and regional human rights instruments, the American Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions share a common core of non-derogable rights and the mutual goal of protecting the physical integrity and dignity inherent in the human being". 13 Thus, one has to wonder whether IHL is not also subject to human rights law in turn or, if not, at least to the respect of human dignity: it certainly is. 10 Mentions of the inalienability of some rights are found in the Preambles to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the two Covenants on Human Rights adopted in 1966 -on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-. On the elements of the non-relational/non-conditional character of dignity-based rights, their inalienability and inherent character, that makes them belong to every human being for the mere fact of being such, see Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Human Even if challenged by some, 16 it is considered that peace is best guaranteed by permitting force only when it is necessary for a State to defend itself against a major use of force or when a multi-lateral decision in that regard that complies with the requirements of necessity and proportionality has been made. If something can be outrightly criticized about the existing framework is its reliance on a politicized and often hypocrite and abusive body, also known as the Security Council, that permits its permanent members to shield themselves and their accomplices (also known as allies) as a result of the power of veto they enjoy.
Even if references to some "just wars" of the past that do not conform with today's standards have been overcome in theory, in practice the norms that regulate the use of force may still be violated or manipulated, that is to say, States may try to violate them and pretend to comply with them by arguing that they are either engaging in self-defense or following an authorization by the Security Council when in fact they ignore the exact scope of its authorization or are not faced with a true threat in the form of a major use of force against them.
Additionally, the militaristic mindset that prevailed prior to 1945 is still ingrained in and still pervades somewhat in some norms. In fact, the almost unlimited "license to kill" given to combatants in international armed conflicts by IHL, that yet prohibits direct and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, disproportionate civilian casualties or the lack of precautionary measures to spare civilian lives, 17 is witness to the consideration that military needs are to be taken into account by international law.
This mould, however, is broken when it comes to non-international armed conflicts, and it is so because the prisoner of war status and the combatant privileges are not automatically present in them, and because those 14 See Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al, Derecho Internacional, curso general, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2010, at 665-666. 15 Ibid. 16 See A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report This regulation can be seen by some as the result of the consideration that in civil wars the inhabitants of a State must comply with that State's domestic law, that may outlaw the activities combatants engage in, especially when carried out against State forces. However, as regulated in humanitarian law treaties, and as considered by the International Committee of the Red Cross and authors such as Marko Milanovic, non-international armed conflicts include but are not limited to "civil wars", encompassing also armed conflicts between non-state actors or "transnational" armed conflicts, which are those in which the conflict surpasses the territory of a given State but where States do not confront each other. 19 As a digression, it must be mentioned that it is perfectly possible that reality surpasses regulation, and that some conflicts are partly regulated as international and partly as noninternational, depending on the relationships being regulated.
As a result of the multiple possibilities of non-international armed conflicts, saying that the differences regarding the acts permitted to combatants in international armed conflicts and non-international ones are explained because of the particular circumstances of "civil wars" cannot be sustained. As expected, abuses may be committed because of this absence of regulation in non-international armed conflicts and controversies may arise: rebels may criticize that they are punished while State agents are not, and in today's sad world captured alleged "terrorists" can receive a treatment that is different from (and possibly worse or as bad as) that expected to be given to State soldiers. As a result, I hold that human rights law must inform IHL in these cases: it constitutes a corpus juris with which to examine the legality of the treatment of combatants, being it necessary to respect the principle of legality, their right to a due process, and their right to life, among others. Likewise, these rights can serve a basis for the regulation of their conduct.
In consequence, for example, those who engage in hostilities against democratic regimes may be perfectly charged with murder for killing State agents, having thus a duty to seek to advance their ideas in accordance with the rule of law, but simultaneously captured rebels must be respected in their rights -some of 18 Can such a rationale not be transplanted to the regulation of international armed conflicts? I think that it is perfectly possible, especially because domestic and international courts, alongside international human rights bodies, have declared that there are occasions in which international human rights law constitutes lex specialis and prevails over IHL and, in consequence, over the military considerations found there.
These events in which human rights law remains autonomous, prevails and can even inform the interpretation of IHL can be summarized as follows: (i) when hostilities are not actually conducted, even if they take place in a zone ravaged by war, autonomous human rights considerations prevail; 21 (ii) when human rights law offers more detailed guidelines and regulations, and examines more in detail some acts (lex specialis consideration strictly speaking); 22 and (iii) when IHL is limited by human rights law, by means of having to respect its tenets and be interpreted in its light, in order to offer a more robust protection of human dignity given the possibility of human dignity being unprotected if human rights considerations are not taken into account, 23 relevant datum because dignity is a foundational value both branches share.
In consequence, it is admissible to say that human rights considerations can also limit or, for a better choice of words, illuminate international humanitarian regulations. If this is possible generally, then nothing prevents this from being applicable in regard to the right to life, also enjoyed by combatants.
In my opinion, when States or armed groups -equally capable of this-resort to aggression and major uses of force in a manner contrary to the prohibition of the use of force 24 , the State has no entitlement to carry out armed operations and this unlawfulness should taint the acts that follow, including attacks against combatants of 20 According to human rights case-law, States that create a risk to human rights are under special stringent duties to behave with more than due diligence in order to prevent that risk from materializing, 34 and I consider that this rationale, based on the need of protecting human beings from irresponsible behavior, can be extended to risks generated by non-state actors as well. In the case being examined, the risk created by violations of the prohibition of the use of force is undeniable, and thus security agents of the offender, that can engage the liability of the entity they represent, should refrain from engaging in hostilities. 30 The ICJ considered that "As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law" (emphasis added), in: The argument that deprivations of life committed by agents of a violator of the jus ad bellum are contrary to human rights law is reinforced by another consideration: the legal principle of ex iniuria jus non oritur prohibits the generation of legal benefits or entitlements as a result of unlawful acts. The principle of the prohibition of the abus de droit, that protects interests of the international community (such as peace and security and the protection of human dignity) may also be invoked. 35 Analyzed globally, thereby, an operation that is initially aggressive cannot constitute the source of legal shields in jus in bello that have their origin in a violation in the jus ad bellum offered to the entities to which that operation is attributable. Ergo, they ought not to be entitled with the permission to kill agents of an entity that is the victim of an act of aggression.
General principles of law such as the ones just examined have been employed by human rights bodies and international courts -this is the case of the principles of the pro homine/pro personae protection, or the principle of effectiveness, among others-36 , and thus mention of the principles that prohibit deriving benefits from wrongful acts or from manipulation of the law in order to deprive it of its purpose and effectiveness is highly pertinent, especially when employed in conjunction with the rule to dispel interpretative uncertainties in order to obtain the goal of human rights law, criterion that is envisaged by the rules of interpretation of international law, 37 and when considering what the position of general principles of law in the international legal system is 38 .
The principles being studied, if employed correctly, can serve to dispel the fears of those that consider that the hands of military agents are tied even if conditions change, ever since attacks against enemy combatants may be permitted after a mutation in the general context, in which say after withdrawing from their aggression the original aggressors are attacked and have a right to self-defense, or in which another army can be attacked due to a multi-lateral authorization that emerges later or because new facts make armed operations fall under the scope of (42), where the value of legal principles when attempting to apply and interpret the multiple international legal norms is acknowledged, recognizing that principles are not hierarchically inferior to other sources of international law, and that their usefulness is not limited to gap-filling. original authorizations issued initially, for instance. As a result, if it is not originally necessary to carry out attacks to protect a civilian population but it later it is, and authorization in that regard exists, then attacks against enemy combatants will not be contrary to the right to life.
Quaestio Iuris
Any doubts in regard to the proposals included herein must be solved following the criterion of the pro homine protection which, besides mandating choosing the norm that most benefits an individual in the protection of her dignity, 39 must in my opinion include the mandate to choose the interpretation that benefits that protection the most.
To my mind, any doubts and uncertainties will be related to the general context of interpretation but not to the fact that life is better protected if not threatened. It can be said that the life of soldiers is at risk if they do not confront enemy combatants: surely, this can be solved if they withdraw from combat altogether. I acknowledge that there are difficult cases, such as when civilian populations are at risk, but in that regard the Security Council has a duty towards that population, given the connections between peace and security and human rights 40 and its role as the sole possible entity that can authorize intervention, whereas home States have a duty to protect populations because of their responsibility to protect. 41 Moreover, the prohibition of the use of force, that includes the only authorized exceptions of self-defense and Security Council authorization within its content, forms part of peremptory law, 42 and hence admits no exception whatsoever, including contrary interpretations or norms.
Let it be further said that human rights violations can be established to happen without having to study the subjective component of awareness or intention, 43 and that thus acts of aggression cannot condone deprivations of life even if soldiers believe that due to (blind) patriotism and the honor and "respectability" of their State they must follow it due to the inappropriateness of international law. where the Court said that " [v] iolations of the Convention cannot be founded upon rules that take psychological factors into account in establishing individual culpability. For the purposes of analysis, the intent or motivation of the agent who has violated the rights recognized by the Convention is irrelevant --the violation can be established even if the identity of the individual perpetrator is unknown. What is decisive is whether a violation of the rights recognized by the Convention has occurred with the support or the acquiescence of the government, or whether the State has allowed the act to take place without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible. Thus, the Court's task is to determine whether the violation is the result of a State's failure to fulfill its duty to respect and guarantee those rights". Arbitrariness can be understood, among others, as basing one's behavior on his own whims or preferences, or as acting unlimited by and disdainful of law and regulations. 45 For the reasons explained thus far, it is risky to prize States or non-state actors that engage in unlawful uses of force by permitting them to manipulate the law, use others as means to satisfy their interests, and having things their way. We would ignore that the loss of a single life is a very serious thing, and that war and armed conflicts are to be deterred and discouraged as most as possible: certainly, admitting that potential violations of the right to life are at stake may suit this purpose and raise awareness about the need of the international community to strive to protect individuals in all situations, in accordance with the universality of human rights protection, that is not only cultural but against all possible threats. 46 Let it be reminded just once more that the right to life prohibits arbitrary deprivations of life for the sake of protecting human dignity.
All in all, regardless of whether IHL is to be limited by and interpreted in the light of human rights law in regard to the right to life, it is out of the question that in human rights law the duty to protect and refrain from threatening the life of human beings is not only applicable both during peace and armed conflicts, but also binds Unfortunately, the previous limitations were adopted by the international legal system, whose very name betrays the State-centrism that has pervaded it for long, reason why I prefer the coined term of jus gentium, encompassing both intra gentes and inter gentes dimensions. 51 Human dignity protective norms have proven that this paradigm no longer endures lest the practice and normative consistency betray its limitations, but yet the reality of non-state actors is hardly grasped in its full by some international norms. This is the case, among others, of norms related to the use of force: those of jus ad bellum and those of jus in bello, comprising both humanitarian and human rights law, among other norms, unlike being reduced to the former, as is usually hinted. Some States that face attacks attributable to non-state actors in this context have resorted to launching attacks against them in the territory of other States. Those that have had this practice are, among others, Turkey, Colombia, the United States, or Israel, and the Security Council seems to accept the lawfulness of those attacks in some situations, as will be explained below. Attacks of this kind are yet controversial, and have aroused doctrinal discussion. Some authors have sided with the States that have committed attacks against non-state groups in the conditions described thus far, considering that they have the right to self-defense in those situations, while others oppose this consideration. Apparently, this issue is unsettled and the uncertainty as to what the regulation permits is highly problematic, ever since it goes against the need of provision of certainty by law. 61 In the light of this, I offer my humble interpretation of the legal issues at stake.
To my mind, the confusion is owed in part to the lack of clarity regarding which are the legal principles at stake. In this sense, most authors seem to consider that all attacks against non-state actors in the territory of a third State are to be analyzed in the light of the prohibition of the use of force, being it thus necessary to examine if the right of self-defense can extend to those attacks. I, however, consider that the prohibition of the use of force is the relevant norm only in some events, but certainly not in all of them. The OAS seems to endorse this opinion.
Let us begin by analyzing when the prohibition of the use of force against States is the norm at stake. Its regulation in article 51 of the U.N. Charter is certainly related to the prohibition of using force against third States, and according to this some regard that attacks against non-state groups operating from the territory of a third State entail, prima facie, a use of force against that State. This opinion is persuasive but not utterly convincing, because I hold that there are two events in which this is so, while in the remaining possibilities it is the principle of territorial integrity which is to be examined. 66 This, along with any absence of a mention of the right of self defense, even in order to dismiss claims to it, suggests that it was the principle of territorial integrity which was to be studied. I agree with this position, because the State is not under attack in those cases: certainly, its territory is the place where hostilities take place, but the specialized character of a norm dealing with the integrity of that territory is the one to be examined. In other words, among the principles of territorial integrity and the regulation of the use of force, the absence of a direct attack against a State and the fact that it is the respect of its territory which is infringed prima facie, mean that the specific norm dealing with the rights of the territorial State is the principle of territorial integrity. After all, States have rights both to not be attacked and to have their territory respected, 67 both of which although interrelated guarantee different dimensions and rights.
Therefore, in those cases the presence of circumstances precluding wrongfulness is to be analyzed in connection with that territorial integrity, rather than employing the notion of inter-State self-defense. In this There is wide consensus among those that endorse this view that self-defense has to meet the same requirements of inter-State self-defense to be lawful, i.e. they must be proportional, necessary, respond to major uses of force, 73 comply with the principle of temporality and respond to actual attacks, which means that preventive self-defense is unlawful, and only self-defense against imminent or actual attacks can be considered legal.
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Discussions, however, are not pacific concerning an additional consideration: which attitude of the third territorial State is necessary for the possibility of lawfully invoking self-defense against non-state actors to be triggered? This is the point that proves to be the most difficult. Some authors regard that it is sufficient for the territorial State to be unable to deal with the non-state actors located in its territory, whereas others allude to the necessity of it being unwilling to do so. 75 Other authors even apparently consider that any of these events justifies for the attacked state to respond against the non-state actor which is operating in another state, the conduct of this latter state must be such to justify the ensuing violation of its sovereignty. Various authors have proposed different standards, but three scenarios seem generally possible, on a scale from the most to the least stringent: (a) the territorial state was complicit or was actively supporting the non-state actor in its armed attack; (b) the territorial state failed to exercise due diligence, i.e. it did not do all that it could reasonably have done to prevent the non-state actor from using its territory to mount an armed attack against another state, or is not doing all it can to prevent further attacks; (c) the territorial state may have exercised due diligence, but it was nonetheless unable to prevent the attack, or to prevent further attacks. The US post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan could be quite comfortably justified under these standards. of the use of force admits exceptions, namely self-defense and authorization by the Security Council, ever since peremptory norms are characterized precisely by their being absolute. 79 Therefore, self-defense and Security
Council authorization are part of the content of the regulation of the use of force, rather than exceptions to it.
Finally, let it be said that some authors consider that authorizing self-defense against non-state actors may lead to anarchy and intensification of hostilities worldwide. The opposite position, however, would permit perpetuation of unchecked attacks against inhabitants of States due to territorial States and non-state actors relying on the impossibility of means available to a State to protect the affected individuals. Let it be said in this connection that, besides being unfair, this would foster impunity, because absence of measures against violations of human dignity -which can be committed by non-state attacks-foster repetition of those conducts, as has been ascertained by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 80 Naturally, this does not translate into endorsing every State reaction, ever since only when serious attacks have been committed and there are no alternative means, self-defense against non-state actors that impinges upon the territorial integrity of another State would be authorized by law, as long as they are conducted in accordance with criteria of proportionality, necessity and humanity, among others.
Jus in bello challenges posed by non-state actors' participation in hostilities.
As mentioned above, there are uncertainties surrounding the legal regulation of the right to resort to force against non-state actors, owed in part to the lack of express codifications on the matter given the international paradigm of the jus gentium legal system that to a great degree still lags behind a reality where multiple non-state actors are rampart and exert influence on the legal system and the global society. 81 This, however, does not equate to saying that law is absolutely silent on those issues, and undoubtedly non-state actors 79 As follows from their description in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Given that instrument's aim of regulating agreements that are treaties, the characterization of peremptory norms as norms that admit no derogation -which hints to agreements or norms against jus cogens-must be interpreted in the sense that this hints to the non-admissibility of any exceptions whatsoever to the effectiveness, display of effects and primacy of jus cogens.
are taken into account by customary law, which besides having a life independent from its conventional counterpart 82 proves to be more dynamic than treaty law in some events, 83 as in the ones being explained.
Simultaneously, the impact of non-state actors that employ armed force during armed conflicts is to be reflected in the regulation of the conduct of hostilities during armed conflicts, i.e. concerning the jus in bello. And this is so because absence of regulation of non-state conduct may encourage and seem to endorse their abuses, while enacting norms that regulate their behavior in these and other situations may change their perspective and attitude, due to acculturation and interiorization processes, 84 besides exposing those actors to shaming and condemnation when they fail to abide by standards imposed on them.
When the expression jus in bello is used, it is usually employed in the understanding that it comprises the law of the Hague and the law of Geneva or, in other words, (contemporary) international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of hostilities by parties to armed conflicts. 85 I, however, consider that the expression also accommodates other norms that are applicable during armed conflicts, because the fact that they do not cease to have effects in those events entails that they continue to bind and regulate the behavior of at least some parties to the conflict. In this sense, it is certainly important to note that human rights law is applicable both in times of peace and of war.
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I will limit my study to some features of IHL and human rights law in this article, bearing in mind that other norms, such as those on the law of refugees or international criminal law, are equally applicable and may form part of the jus in bello, which also comprises secondary or derived rules, as some issued by the Security
Council, that may place obligations on combatants even if they are non-state actors 87 . Let me comment one more thing regarding the jus in bello: its applicability is not dependent upon the lawfulness of prior attacks or, in other words, compliance with jus ad bellum. 88 As a result, whether self-defense or collective security operations duly 82 authorized by the Security Council are conducted or not, the conduct of those who take part in hostilities must abide by the jus in bello. Human rights law has a peculiar dilemma: is it applicable to non-state actors? This, however, will be studied shortly.
When it comes to international humanitarian law, it seems settled that the norms of this branch, as part of the international legal system, can impose duties on non-state armed groups, as Theodor Meron or Andrew for Protocol II to be applicable, the conflict must "take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." Therefore, besides ruling out transnational conflicts, or conflicts between non-state actors, non-state parties to the conflict must have some conditions for the Protocol to have effects that are not required for common article 3 to apply to these and other non-international armed conflicts.
they, however, are conducted between parties at least some of which are non-state actors and have a transnational character, in the sense that they surpass the territory of a single State. Naturally, those conflicts would not be international armed conflicts, ever since they do not involve the confrontation of States among themselves.
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On the other hand, however, at first glance it seems as if common article 3 would not be applicable either, because that provision seems to stress the idea of a conflict taking place within the territory of a State. 93 This problem has been acknowledged by the ICRC and, as Marko Milanovic comments, has led that organization to extend the guarantees of non-international armed conflicts to these transnational armed conflicts in practice, stretching the applicability of conventional international humanitarian law. 94 This extension is more than welcome and necessary, because guarantees, rights and duties that protect the victims of war are necessary and imperative.
However, in my opinion unlike common article 3, currently the category of non-international armed conflicts in customary law clearly comprises both transnational and national non-international armed confrontations, thus being it impossible to consider that this exercise is creative -although creativeness would be necessary otherwise, as the law of human dignity and its peremptory norms demand-.
Let it be further said that the practice of some States, such as the United States of America -through its Supreme Court-, endorse the idea that common article 3 makes IHL applicable in transnational armed conflicts.
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To my mind, the assertion made by Marko Milanovic that the problems may be solved when considering that it is not necessary to stretch common article 3 but, rather, that it can be considered that customary international humanitarian law regulating non-international armed conflicts does not know the geographical limitations of common article 3, 96 proves to be very persuasive.
Concerning international human rights law, let me begin by reminding that it is applicable in times of war and does not cease to produce effects when IHL comes into play. That States are bound by their norms is a given, but when it comes to non-state actors, let the following be said: besides doctrinal, codification, progressive development and jurisprudential discussions that show how nothing prevents international norms, even those of human rights law, from placing obligations upon any actor as long as they respect jus cogens and are produced in accordance with the sources of international law, 97 there is an underlying assumption in the decisions of international bodies: from a factual point of view, non-state actors are capable of injuring human beings and attacking the content and enjoyment of human rights. This is recognized by mentions of the destruction or abuse 92 Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 93 That article states that it is applicable "In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" (emphasis added). As a result, two tasks must be undertaken: firstly, it is necessary to create de lege ferenda obligations of non-state armed entities in order to prevent their injuring human dignity, the foundation of human rights law.
Secondly, interpretation of existing law must be made in a way that acknowledges that those human rights that have the status of jus cogens norms and can be factually violated by non-state actors impose an implied duty of abstaining from abusing those rights (duty of respect) on those actors. This has been intuitively handled, and in fact there has been international criminal prosecution of torture against individuals (who are non-state actors) for committing or aiding in the commission of this crime that is also a human rights abuse and a violation of IHL. The previous consideration that different branches, such as IHL and human rights law, are interlinked, leads us to the widely commented connection between those formal branches. Most of the time it has been considered by International Courts -e.g. the ICJ or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights-that during armed conflicts some human rights are to be interpreted in the light of IHL, given the latter's eventual condition of lex specialis in the regulation of armed conflicts. 104 While this is so in many cases, given the more detailed and specialized regulation during armed conflicts that IHL provides sometimes, that it is not always the case.
Concerning this, when they do not conflict with each other, given their simultaneous applicability, 105 at least four alternative situations have been commented upon. First of all, as Philip Alston has suggested, human rights law should not be deferent with IHL when hostilities are not being conducted 106 : in those events, even within the broader framework or context of an armed conflict, affirming a specialized character of IHL would be impertinent, given the specialized character of human rights in comparison.
Secondly, as Marko Milanovic and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have considered, in some events it is precisely human rights law which is more specialized and detailed than IHL, 107 and given the latter's inclusion of human rights, broadness and vagueness in such events, it must be interpreted in the light of human rights law, as its lex specialis.
Thirdly, as follows from a judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court, human rights law may limit international humanitarian law in some events, thus protecting the guarantees of the protection of human dignity more strongly than do the often sad norms of IHL, 108 given the importance of military necessity for them. 109 Lastly, according to the International Court of Justice, it is very accurately deemed that IHL and human rights law have, besides intersections, spheres in which they are not interrelated 110 and thus in them no interpretation according to the criterion of lex specialis is warranted but both spheres would apply on their own.
In conclusion, rather than IHL being automatically lex specialis during armed conflicts, the mutual Another issue related to the participation of non-state actors in armed conflicts is that of the direct participation of civilians in hostilities. As conventional and customary IHL state, civilians cannot be lawfully the direct object of an attack unless and as long as they directly participate in hostilities. 115 While members of nonstate armed groups and these groups themselves are clearly non-state actors, the condition of those individuals belonging to the armed forces of a non-state entity is unclear as to whether they are civilians or not, which is certainly problematic. 116 This problem has to do with the question of whether they may be targeted even when not taking part in armed activities in the case that they have ongoing combat operations within non-state armed groups. The same question applies to members of security companies with continuous combat functions operating during armed conflicts, who may or not be civilians, ever since their performance of acts considered to amount to direct participation in hostilities in accordance with the instructions given to them and their continuous functions may make them members of an armed party to a conflict, either formally or de facto, or they may even become independent parties to an armed conflict, in the opinion of the ICRC.
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Regarding the question of their being targeted, according to a report issued by the ICRC, individuals with an ongoing or continuous combat function in an armed group lose their civilian status and become combatants, and hence can be targeted at any time when belonging to non-state armed groups or operating on their own.
Otherwise, if an individual does not participate in hostilities for a party to them in accordance with a continuous combat function and is thus not a combatant, he is a civilian and can only be lawfully targeted by parties to an armed conflict during his direct participation in hostilities 118 Concerning this opinion, Philip Alston has voiced his concerns and disagreement with the notion of continuous or ongoing combat functions, because he thinks that it may be contrary to the temporal limit on the possibility of attacking civilians put forth in the norms that permit these attacks in as long as civilians participate directly in hostilities, which would be ignored by this doctrine. 119 The Study on customary international law conducted by the ICRC, however, points out that ignoring this continuity of combat functions may create an 115 Regarding the operation of private security companies, let it be said that, as doctrine has rightly considered, they can be mercenaries if they meet the requirements of article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, whose content is reflected in customary law applicable to international armed conflicts, 123 and it is considered that mercenaries cannot enjoy the status of prisoners of war in non-international armed conflicts, where it does not exist. 124 Apart from this, the problem of their participation is twofold, at least: they may
give the opportunity to States that hire them to circumvent democratic controls and checks concerning the waging of war and, additionally, their being mainly profit-oriented may distort practice and lead them to attach little or no importance to peace by overvaluing the money they get. 125 This, coupled with the phenomenon of the detachment and lack of empathy that can surround attacks carried out by these and other individuals from a computer and far from the battlefield, 126 is at least risky and worrisome.
Finally, let it be reminded that the jus ad bellum considerations are irrelevant when analyzing if parties to an armed conflict are bound by the jus in bello, because even if an attack is lawful, actions in its context may be illegal. Likewise, it seems that an unlawful use of force -violation of the jus ad bellum-does not automatically render actions of combatants belonging to the party to whom those uses are attributable unlawful: they are regulated by the independent jus in bello. The fact that, for instance, the crime of aggression is independent of war crimes, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity, 127 seems to support this consideration: both can be violated simultaneously, but this is not necessarily so all the times. 120 See Rule 6 of the Customary IHL Database of the ICRC, based on the Study on customary international humanitarian law conducted by the ICRC, regarding "Civilians' Loss of Protection from Attack". 121 The detailed conditions that, in opinion of the ICRC, make an act direct participation in hostilities are put forth in:
CONCLUSIONS
As explored in this article, contemporary dynamics pose risks of excessive uses of force. Firstly, there is a risk of a temptation to exaggerate regarding what lethal attacks are permitted. As pointed out above, there is a connection between peace and human rights, as highlighted by the links between the duties and role of the Security Council and these rights and as expressly mentioned by the human rights Committee. It is self-evident that during armed conflicts life is constantly at risk, and so to my mind legal interpretation and practice cannot continue to endorse the possibility of IHL being taken advantage of in order to permit abusive entities to tweak its norms and treat individuals as their means, disregarding their dignity and placing State or non-state interests, often selfish, 128 over truly humanitarian considerations. Otherwise, we would be going backwards and ignoring that international law has been progressing towards its humanization, although we must not be blinded believing that this process has come to an end 129 but rather identify possible gaps and points to which attention must be given, such as the one being studied in this article.
Even if the premises and ideas expounded in this text are not agreed with, it cannot be denied that a militaristic mindset still pervades IHL and that following it may put lives at risk or even encouraging resorting to war, something that must be discouraged in order to try to generate a new attitude towards resorting to war and respecting human dignity. In fact, IHL was successful in modifying the behavior of non-state actors to a certain extent in the past, 130 so if the arguments presented herein are considered not to be lex lata, then at least de lege ferenda their adoption may contribute to human dignity and human rights considerations being prevalent and always present, thus being it possible to employ them in order to shame States and non-state actors that kill during "unjust wars" and to hold them responsible, aiming to generate a new dynamic in which recourse to force is not treated lightly and the respect life is truly treated as supreme. 131 As mentioned before, none of this aims to prevent multi-lateral authorizations of force or self-defense when they are necessary to protect civilian populations, but it must not be forgotten that human rights considerations should also bind the Security Council, that is not to be a limitless entity but must behave in accordance to the rule of law, 132 being necessary for it to consider human rights law. 133 Additionally, it is important to say that the blurring of the borders between jus ad bellum and jus in bello proposed here do not entail their disappearance. This is to be avoided because, as has been pointed out, this disappearance could prevent imposing limits on the conduct of all parties to hostilities (if jus ad bellum prevailed)
or the eventual impossibility of charging an entity with violating the prohibition of the use of force (if jus in bello prevailed). 134 However, an absolute hermetic separation also runs the risk of legitimating violations of human dignity, and thus adoption of the middle path of blurring the boundaries is advisable.
On the other hand there is the problem of non-state conduct that has the same intensity as State major uses of force, which can evidently dramatically affect individuals. The global legal good 135 of security and peace is not only threatened when it reaches international dimensions: every disturbance to this legal good is of the concern of the global community even when it takes place within the confines of a single country, as attested by efforts by the international community to deal with internal conflicts, regulated by its norms.
Globalization has reinforced the power of some non-state actors, thus making more evident problems that however already existed or were potential before. The need to protect individuals in armed conflicts and from the actions of non-state armed actors makes it necessary to adjust our legal understanding and practice in order to be able to fully provide the protection of human dignity that every individual deserves given her/his inner worth, which is not conditional.
Sometimes, this protection can be granted by adjusting our interpretation of existing norms regulating the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. However, in other events law must change de lege ferenda. Customarily,
